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I. INTRODUCTION
The Warsaw Convention' contains three limitations on the
1. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transpor-
tation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (1934), 49 U.S.C. § 1502 [hereinafter
cited as Warsaw Convention]. The Convention was the result of two conferences, the first in
Paris in 1925, and the second in Warsaw in 1929. The United States adhered to the Conven-
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tort liability of international air carriers. Article 22 allows a carrier
to place monetary limitations on baggage losses and personal in-
jury; article 28 restricts venue.2 In the United States, considerable
controversy has centered on the propriety of limiting private tort
liability by treaty. Recent decay in the value of the limitations has
made the problem more acute.
The monetary limitations were low in 1929 when they were
drafted.3 Forty years of inflation and the institution of a "two tier"
bifurcated price for gold in 1968" drove them lower. An April,
1984, Supreme Court decision6 to uphold the limitations on the ba-
sis of an outmoded and repealed "official" price for gold has forced
them lower still.
In Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corporation, the
Supreme Court pegged the Warsaw Convention limitation of liabil-
ity for baggage and freight to the repealed 1973 official price for
gold.' This Supreme Court decision was the first to directly scruti-
nize the Warsaw Convention. A second decision regarding the
tion in 1934. See generally Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw
Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497 (1967).
2. Article 22 limits carrier liability to 250 gold francs per kilogram for checked baggage,
5,000 francs for baggage carried by the passenger, and 125,000 francs for each passenger for
personal injury or death. It defines a franc as 65.5 milligrams of gold at a fineness of nine
hundred thousandths. At the last official U.S. exchange rate of $42.22 per ounce, these
figures convert to roughly $9.07 per pound of checked baggage, or about $10,000 per passen-
ger. The Article permits a higher limitation by "special declaration" (for baggage) or "spe-
cial contract" (for passengers). Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 22.
Article 28 limits the venue to the territory of an adherent to the Convention, with a
further restriction to the domicile of the carrier, the destination, or the place where the
ticket was sold, if the carrier has an office there. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 28.
Notably absent is the place of occurrence of the injury. The addition of the place of the
accident as an available forum was debated by the conference, but the question was decided
in the negative. A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW 7-27 n.e (2d ed. 1981).
3. A. LOWENFELD, supra note 2, at 7-27.
4. One tier consisted of the free market, where the gold price was set by supply and
demand; the other tier was the official price of $35 an ounce, which was maintained by the
central banks of the seven nation Gold Pool solely for effectuating transfers among partici-
pating governments. Between 1968 and November of 1973, when the two-tier system was
officially terminated, the free market price of gold nearly tripled. K. ROSENN, LAW AND IN-
FLATION 53-54 (1982).
5. The term "lower" is here used in respect to value rather than an absolute figure. The
nominal amount has increased slowly over the years, but at nowhere near the rate of infla-
tion. See generally K. ROSENN, LAW AND INFLATION (1982) (excellent explication of nominal-
ism, metallism, revalorization, and the effects of inflation in legal relationships).
6. Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243 (1984).
7. Par Value Modification Act, Pub. L. No. 93-110 § 1, 87 Stat. 352 (1973) (repealed by
Bretton Woods Agreements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-564, § 6, 90 Stat. 2660 (1976)).
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Warsaw Convention in March, 1985,8 and an apparent split in the
circuits on still a third Warsaw question indicate that the Su-
preme Court may soon consider the dichotomy between the limita-
tions provisions of the Warsaw Convention and the principle of
American law that everyone injured should have an adequate
remedy.
In Franklin Mint the Court only decided with reference to the
limitations on checked baggage;10 the venue and personal injury
limitations were not at issue. The decision has powerful implica-
tions for these issues, however. This article will attempt to analyze
the Court's opinion and project its possible effect on subsequent
personal injury and venue litigation.
II. BAGGAGE LIMITATIONS
In March, 1979, Franklin Mint delivered four packages weigh-
ing 714 pounds to Trans World Airlines (TWA) for transportation
from Philadelphia to London." They made no special declaration
of value." The packages were lost and Franklin Mint brought suit
for $250,000.1' TWA admitted liability but pleaded the limitation
under the Warsaw Convention. 4 The district court ruled that
TWA's liability was limited to $6,475.98, calculated from the
weight of the packages, the Warsaw Convention's limitation on lia-
bility, and the last official price of gold in the United States.15 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, but also ruled that the
limitations would become unenforceable sixty days from the issu-
ance of the mandate.' The Supreme Court affirmed that portion
of the judgment of the court of appeals which affirmed the judg-
ment of the district court, but rejected the declaration that the
Convention is prospectively unenforceable.1
8. Air France v. Saks, 105 S. Ct. 1338 (1985).
9. The Second and Fifth Circuits may have split on the issue of whether pre-judgment
interest is included in the limitation of liability. The Second Circuit attempted to distin-
guish the Fifth Circuit opinion on the basis of application of state law as opposed to pru-
dential awards, but the two courts seemed to have reached diametrically opposed results in
analyzing the same crash. See infra notes 110-22 and accompanying text.
10. 466 U.S. 243.
11. Id. at 246.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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It should be noted at the outset that the opinion refers to a
commercial transaction, with two merchants dealing at arms length
in a contractual setting. What applicability the ruling will have in
a less doctrinaire setting is uncertain.
Justice O'Connor delivered the Court's opinion. The question
presented was whether TWA's tariff (which contained a liability
limitation of $9.07 per pound of cargo) was inconsistent with the
Warsaw Convention.1 8 The threshold question was whether the
1978 repeal of the Par Value Modification Act,19 which eliminated
an "official" price for gold in the U.S., rendered the Convention's
gold-based liability limit unenforceable in this country.20
Continuation of the limit requires a choice of standard to re-
place the repealed "official" conversion rate. In its district court
brief, TWA suggested three possible choices for a standard: (1)
The Special Drawing Right (SDR) of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), (2) the last official price of gold in the U.S., or (3) the
current exchange value of the French franc.2 In its brief, Franklin
Mint suggests a fourth alternative, the free market price of gold.22
As the circuit court noted, each of these solutions has a devas-
tating argument against it.
The last official price of gold is a price which has been ex-
plicitly repealed by Congress .... It thus lacks any status in
law or relationship to contemporary currency values. The free
market price of gold is the highly volatile price of a commodity
determined in part by forces of supply and demand unrelated to
currency values. The SDR's are a creature of the IMF, modified
at will by that body and having no basis in the Convention. The
French franc is simply one domestic currency, subject to change
by the unilateral act of a single government.2
The district court chose the last official price of gold in the
United States as the appropriate unit of conversion.2' The court of
18. Id. at 245.
19. Par Value Modification Act, Pub. L. No. 93-110, § 1, 87 Stat. 352 (1973) (repealed
by Bretton Woods Agreements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-564, § 6, 90 Stat. 2660 (1976)).
20. Franklin Mint, 466 U.S. at 245.
21. Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 525 F. Supp. 1288, 1289 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), afl'd, 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982) (modified to restrict prospective application), aff'd,
466 U.S. 243 (1984) (revoked modification).
22. Id.
23. Franklin Mint, 690 F.2d at 306.
24. Id. at 309.
580 [Vol. 17:3
WARSAW CONVENTION
appeals acquiesced; but declared that it was beyond the court's
power to select a new basis of conversion. 5 It reasoned that Con-
gress had abandoned the unit of conversion specified by the Con-
vention; the repeal of the Par Value Modification Act was a legisla-
tive declaration that the United States would no longer recognize
an official price for gold. Since there was no "official" price for gold
in the United States, there could be no gold standard in the Con-
vention.2 6 This apparently is where the court of appeals went
astray, for the conversion factor was selected and promulgated by
the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) in an administrative procedure
authorized by Congress. The court's function was to review that
selection for compliance with the law. This function becomes quite
plain in the wording of the Supreme Court's decision.
The Court of Appeals correctly recognized that the Conven-
tion's liability limit must be converted into dollars. This require-
ment derives not from the Convention itself-the Convention
merely permits such a conversion-but from the tariff require-
ments of § 403(a) of the FAA. 49 U.S.C. § 1373(a).
In 1979, when Franklin Mint's cargo was lost, TWA's tariffs
set the carrier's cargo liability at $9.07 per pound. This tariff
had been filed with and accepted by the CAB pursuant to §
403(a), and was squarely consistent with CAB Order 74-1-16.
The $9.07-per-pound limit thus represented an Executive
Branch determination, made pursuant to properly delegated au-
thority, of the appropriate rate for converting the Convention's
liability limits into United States dollars. We are bound to up-
hold that determination unless we find it to be contrary to law
established by domestic legislation or by the Convention itself.27
The Court disposed of the domestic legislation inquiry post
haste. "It is clear, first, that the CAB's choice of a cargo liability
limit of $9.07 per pound does not contravene any domestic legisla-
tion. ''2 The Court did not consider that the constitutional issue of
liability limitation by treaty was before it, and chose only to con-
sider the narrow issue of whether the Executive had the authority
to set the value of a limit which the Court assumes is itself legal
and proper. In this case, which sounds more in contract than in
tort, the determination would certainly have been that the limita-
25. Id. at 311.
26. Id. at 309.
27. Franklin Mint, 466 U.S. at 254 (footnotes omitted).
28. Id.
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tions were constitutional. In considering the narrow question it
outlined for itself, the Court found that when Congress repealed
the Par Value Modification Act, there was no hint that either of
the political branches expected or intended that Act to affect the
dollar equivalent of the Convention's liability limit.
29
The inquiry into the compatibility of the repeal of the Par
Value Modification Act with the Convention itself is more debata-
ble. This analysis requires an inquiry into the purposes of the Con-
vention with respect to the inclusion of liability limits expressed in
gold. According to the Franklin Mint opinion, the first and most
obvious purpose was to set some limit on a carrier's liability for
lost cargo. The Court suggests that any conversion factor will have
this effect.30
The second objective was to set a stable, predictable, and in-
ternationally uniform limit that would encourage the growth of a
fledgling industry. Ignoring the fact that the industry is by no
stretch of the imagination a fledgling industry after 55 years, the
Court determined that $9.07 per pound meets this purpose.31 The
Court reasoned that this figure is a stable and predictable limit
upon which carriers can rely, and with occasional adjustments, it
can become internationally uniform. According to the Court's anal-
ysis, since 1978 this dollar figure has maintained a relatively equal
value with limitations set in SDR's.3 2 What the Court neglected to
consider is that both SDR's and dollars are governmental money
standards- subject to devaluation by inflation and other machina-
tions of governments.3 3 The fact that they have varied together is
more testament to the United States' power in international polit-
ics than to a maintenance of value equivalent of the dollar. As Jus-
tice Stevens noted in his dissent, the convention chose gold as a
standard for precisely this reason.3 4 To abandon gold for an artifi-
cial standard is to rewrite the treaty.
The Court noted that "a third purpose of the Convention's
gold-based limit may have been to link the Convention to a con-
stant value, that would keep step with the average value of cargo
29. Id.
30. According to the Court, with regard to setting a limit, "a $9.07-per-pound liability
limit is as reasonable as one based on SDR's or the free market price of gold." Id. at 256.
31. Id. at 256.
32. Id. at 256-57.
33. See generally K. ROSENN, supra note 5. (particularly chapter 3, The Value of
Money for Legal Purposes, 36-61).
34. 466 U.S. at 265-68 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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carried and so remain equitable for carriers and transport users
alike. '3'5 Analyzing this purpose, the court fell prey to the parochi-
alism that it warns against.36 Fluctuations in the price of a com-
modity can be viewed in two ways. The commodity can be said to
vary in value, or the money in which it is priced can vary in value.
The Court chose for its rationale a firm foundation in nominalism 37
and discussed the wildly varying price of gold since the dollar was
floated in 1978. It reached the conclusion that maintaining a gold
price standard would be forcing the carriers to speculate in gold."
Equally as logical would be an argument that adopting a dollar
standard forces the shippers to speculate in dollars. In 1860 it was
possible to buy a fine men's suit for a twenty dollar gold piece.3 9 It
is still possible to do so today.'0 The gold in the gold piece and the
value of the suit have varied together for over one hundred and
twenty-five years, but the dollar, which the Court insists on using
as a standard, has deteriorated so badly that the suit is now worth
at least fifteen times what it was.
11. ANALYSIS
The timing of the Franklin Mint decision is of particular in-
terest. The Par Value Modification Act was repealed in 1978,4"
leaving the United States without an official exchange rate for
gold. Three months into 1979, Franklin Mint shipped a package
containing valuable coins with a value equal to an equivalent
35. Id. at 258-59.
36. Id. at 256.
37. Nominalism is a monetary theory that debts should be discharged by using the face
or nominal value of money, and not an equivalent value based on the intrinsic metallic value
(metallism) or a price index (valorism) at the time the debt was incurred. Stated another
way, nominalism holds that the value of money is the value imposed by the sovereign and
not any intrinsic or equivalent value. See K. ROSENN, supra note 5, at 38-61.
38. 466 U.S. at 258.
39. Advertisement by Evans' haberdashery (offering cashmere suits at $6, $10, $12, $15,
$18, and $20), N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1860, at 5, col. 5.
40. Although the nominal price of a fine suit is now around $300, a twenty dollar gold
piece (double eagle) contains 516 grains of .900 to 1.000 fine gold. I. HOMANS, THE COIN
BOOK (1872). There are 480 grains in a Troy ounce, the system used in measuring precious
metals. Troy Weight in 27 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 163 (1963). Thus the twenty dollar
gold piece contains approximately one ounce of pure gold. The December 9, 1985, spot price
for gold was approximately $320 per ounce, depending on the market. Gold, Miami Herald,
Dec. 10, 1985, at 9D, col. 5. Thus, discounting any numismatic value, the coin's gold content
alone is sufficient to purchase the suit after a hundred and twenty-five years.
41. Bretton Woods Agreements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-564, § 6, 90 Stat. 2660
(1976)(repealing Par Value Modification Act, Pub. L. No. 93-110, § 1, 87 Stat. 352 (1973)).
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
weight of gold. Although the alleged value of the shipment was
well above TWA's tariff limitation on liability, Franklin Mint
made no special declaration of value. When the package was lost,
Franklin Mint urged that the conversion factor in the Warsaw
Convention should be judicially determined to be the free market
price for gold. Had this suit been successful, the carriers would
have been prevented from any meaningful limitation of liability by
article 23, which provides that "any provision tending to relieve
the carrier of liability or to fix a lower limit than that which is laid
down by this convention shall be null and void .... 42
Two merchants, dealing in good faith, at arms length, and
schooled in the ways of commerce, should be allowed to contract
for any apportionment of the risks of their contract that they be-
lieve equitable. 4s' Franklin Mint was not a nescient traveler, bereft
of luggage byv some wily artisan, but a merchant, fully aware of the
danger, and apparently willing to accept the risk in exchange for
some advantage. It is interesting to speculate whether that advan-
tage had to do with the savings in drayage or with the possibility
of a profound impact on the law of carriage.
The Court did not accept the invitation to invalidate the limi-
tations of liability by judicial fiat. Nor did it find the limitations
unenforceable because of the lack of a standard. Throwing the re-
sponsibility firmly on the executive branch, the Court chose among
poor alternatives" to reach the most equitable result it could with-
out invalidating an international treaty supported by the Execu-
tive and consented to by the Senate.
The danger in this decision is that it sets a precedent which
may be carried over into situations in which the parties are not
merchants and are not willingly accepting the risk for advantage;
indeed, in which one party may be unaware that there is any limi-
tation other than the worth of his loss.
IV. PERSONAL INJURY
By far the most perplexing problems with the Warsaw Con-
vention's limitations on liability are those dealing with personal in-
42. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 23.
43. Martin v. The Harris Co., 767 F.2d 296, 299 (6th Cir. 1985); Grumman Allied Indus-
tries v. Rohr Industries, 748 F.2d 729, 730, 733-37 (2d Cir. 1984).
44. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text (discussion of the alternatives availa-
ble to the Court and the objections to each).
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juries and wrongful death. Contractual limitation of tort liability
for negligence has been held to be against public policy. 5 On the
other hand, cases have held that the convention preempts state
laws which implement this policy. For example, the trial court in
In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia"' applied the California rules on
choice of law to find that the California substantive law should ap-
ply. The court held that the Warsaw limitation is based on a con-
tract between the passenger and the carrier. Since California's
Wrongful Death Statute does not permit a decedent to compro-
mise by contract his survivor's right to recovery, the limitations
could have no application against survivors. 7 The Ninth Circuit
reversed and held that although the district court may have con-
cluded that the Warsaw Convention did not expressly preempt the
state law, it failed to consider whether the application of California
law would conflict with the congressional scheme embodied in the
convention. 8 Federal law may also preempt the application of
state law where the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress. 49 The Ninth Circuit held that such a conflict did exist,
and that California law is preempted by the Warsaw Convention to
the extent that the application of California law would prevent the
application of the convention's limitation on liability.5 0 The Ninth
Circuit, however, remanded, since the trial court did not reach the
constitutional issues and improperly excluded evidence probative
to the issue of "willful misconduct."'"
Many lower courts have gone to great lengths to find that the
Warsaw Convention does not apply. In order to understand the
reasoning for these decisions, it is necessary to analyze the histori-
cal basis of the Warsaw Convention.
V. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: BACKGROUND
52
There are three unique agreements that apply to international
45. Northwest Airlines v. Alaska Airlines, 351 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. 1965). See also
Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 584.
46. 462 F. Supp. 1114 (C.D. Cal. 1978), rev'd, 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982).
47. In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 462 F. Supp. at 1117-26.
48. In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 684 F.2d at 1307.
49. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
50. In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 684 F.2d at 1308.
51. Id.
52. See generally Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1. For history subsequent to
1967, see also McKenry, Aviation Law Report, 14 LAW. AM. 113 (1982).
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air transportation. The first is the Warsaw Convention. The other
two, known respectively as the Hague Protocol and the Montreal
Agreement, are modifications of the basic Warsaw Convention.
Taken together, these three agreements purport to provide uni-
formity among signatories as to air transportation between "High
Contracting Parties," the convention's name for signatories and
adherents. The most prominent effect of the agreements is to se-
verely limit the liability of international air carriers. In the United
States, where the official price for gold was $35 per ounce until
1971,5' the basic Warsaw Convention limited international airline
travelers to a recovery of approximately $8,291 in an action for
personal injury or wrongful death. 4 The Hague Protocol, which
took effect among signatories in August, 1963, addressed certain
defects of language in the original convention and raised the limi-
tation to $16,254. 55 In 1965, the United States, who had failed to
ratify the Hague Protocol because of controversy in the Senate
over the inadequacy of the increase,56 denounced the Warsaw Con-
vention and threatened to withdraw unless the limit was raised to
a more realistic figure."' An urgent meeting among air carriers in
response to this denunciation resulted in the Montreal Agreement,
which affects only those trips that operate in the United States.
Relying on the special contract provisions of article 22 of the con-
vention, the carriers agreed to file tariffs which waived the limita-
tions provision up to $75,000.58 This figure is not pegged to the
price of gold, but is in dollars. The carriers also agreed to waive the
due care defense allowed by article 20.59 These waivers were
deemed sufficient and the United States withdrew its denuncia-
tion. 0 The Montreal Agreement was supposed to be an interim
measure until the passage of a more permanent solution, the
Guatamala Protocol.6 This protocol, however, has never taken ef-
53. Franklin Mint, 466 U.S. at 248.
54. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 22.
55. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 509.
56. Id. at 512-16.
57. Id. at 497.
58. Id. at 588.
59. Id. at 587.
60. Id. at 497.
61. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 552. This article does not refer to
the Guatamala City Protocol by that name, but refers to it in a discussion on the United
States' requirements to withdraw its denunciation: "an international agreement on limits of
liability . . . in the area of $100,000." For history subsequent to 1967, see also McKenry,
supra note 52. In addition to the Guatamala City Protocol, signed March 8, 1971, two other
protocols were signed at Montreal on September 25, 1975, Montreal Protocols Nos. 3 & 4.
[Vol. 17:3
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fect, and the Montreal Agreement is still the limit after nineteen
highly inflationary years. It is interesting to note that if the Court
in Franklin Mint had chosen the free market price for gold as a
proper standard, a gold price of $350 would have yielded $82,910
as a limitation under the basic Warsaw Convention, and $165,820
under the Hague Protocol.
The limitations imposed by these agreements are carried for-
ward under the color of freedom of contract. Due to industry wide
uniformity, the contract involved (the airline ticket) takes on the
attributes of an adhesion contract, where the prospective passenger
can either accept the limitations or refrain from using the airlines
as a mode of transportation. A comparison of the competing carri-
ers' ticket stock supports this proposition. Identical wording on
American or Mexicana Airline's tickets proclaims: "No agent, ser-
vant or representative of carrier has authority to alter, modify or
waive any provision of this contract.""2 A traveler on one of these
airlines has no power to bargain for the provisions of the contract.
The contract offered is essentially the same for all International
Air Transportation Association (IATA) carriers; hence no realistic
choice exists.
VI. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: ANALYSIS
The limitations imposed by these agreements have an im-
The United States Senate has not ratified any of the Warsaw Convention Protocols. Ratifi-
cation of any of them would have had a profound effect on Franklin Mint. The two Mon-
treal Protocols set the limits in SDR's, one of the alternatives Justice O'Connor considered
and rejected. The Guatalamala City Protocol contains the following language in article 22
(4): "Conversion of the sums into national currencies other than gold shall, in the case of
judicial proceedings, be made according to the gold value of such currencies at the date of
judgment," in other words, the free market price of gold. McKenry, supra note 52, at 116
(discussing Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977)).
McKenry analyzed dicta in Reed and accurately predicted that the Second Circuit viewed
the present article 22 limits as providing a conversion lower than a free market price of gold.
His prognostication was vindicated several months later when the court decided Franklin
Mint and chose the last official price for gold, approximately one-tenth the free market
price. The fact that the case required such a choice at all vindicated another of his predic-
tions: that it was doubtful that any of the Protocols would achieve acceptance in the near
future, particularly in the United States.
62. The quoted paragraph is number 11 on a recent American Airlines ticket; it is para-
graph 9 on both Mexicana's and on an unidentified U.S. airline's ticket reproduced in the
Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn article. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 513. At
government behest, the Montreal Agreement among airlines addressed the subject of notice
to the passenger. If anything, the adhesion nature of the contract was increased. The word-
ing of the contractural portion of the ticket was made uniform virtually industry-wide.
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mense effect on individual passengers. If a passenger is flying inter-
nationally between the territories of two High Contracting Parties
on an air carrier which signed the Montreal Agreement, and the
origin, destination, or an intermediate stop is in the United States,
the absolute liability of the carrier, regardless of its negligence or
the amount of damage inflicted on the customer, is $75,000.63 If
medical bills were $500,000, the carrier responsible would only be
liable for a maximum of $75,000, and the passenger would be re-
sponsible for the remaining $425,000 plus legal fees. Moreover, the
limitation of liability is even more severe and unfair if the Mon-
treal Agreement does not apply. If the High Contracting Parties
were also signatories of the Hague Protocol and the proposed rout-
ing does not touch the United States, the limit is approximately
$20,000, depending on current conversion rates.6 If only the basic
Warsaw Convention applies, the limit to recovery, including hospi-
tal bills, legal fees, and incidentals, is about $10,000.65 Assuming
that a passenger was properly ticketed, the only way to avoid these
limitations is to prove "wilful misconduct" on the part of the
carrier."
VII. VENUE
Limitation of venue provides additional protection for the car-
riers. Article 28 of the Convention provides that suit can be
brought only in the territory of one of the High Contracting Par-
ties. Venue is further limited to the destination of the journey, the
domicile of the carrier, or the place where the ticket was sold, if
the carrier has a place of business there. 7 This sounds simple
enough, but think of the New York businessman on vacation in
Martinique who finds that he needs to make an unplanned trip to
Mexico. He travels on Air France, and is killed when the crew neg-
ligently dozes off and the plane crashes in Florida. His widow and
five children will find that it is uneconomical to sue. The maximum
63. Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the
Hague Protocol, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966) (proposed May 13, 1966) [hereinafter cited as the
Montreal Agreement].
64. Warsaw Convention as modified by the Hague Protocol, supra notes 1, 2.
65. Id.
66. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 25. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra
note 1, at 503-04. See also Brief for Plaintiffs in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,
Grosse v. Mexicana Airlines, No. 69 L 14247 (Cir. Ct. Ill. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Brief for
Plaintiffs).
67. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 28.
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the six of them can collect is $20,000. Additionally, suit must be
brought in Paris, Mexico, or possibly Martinique, despite the fact
that the aircraft crashed in the United States, the dead passenger
was a United States citizen, and Air France has a strong presence
in the United States market. Unfair? Possibly, but according to
the Warsaw Convention as modified, the result is legal.
An argument can be made that in exchange for this restriction
of venue, article 28 extended venue where it would not normally
reach, particularly in the case of a round trip in which one of the
legs is performed by a carrier which does not do business at the
origin/destination. An example would be a round trip from New
York: flying first to London on Pan American, then from London
to Rome on British European Airways (BEA), who did not operate
in the United States, and from Rome to New York on Alitalia.
Theoretically, BEA could be sued in New York. However, even if
jurisdiction can be extended over BEA by treaty, it will be difficult
to attain service of process.
There are very few cases on this point because few carriers
choose to eschew the lucrative United States market. The most ap-
plicable decision is Berner v. United Airlines, Inc.6 8 in which the
lower court found that article 28 allowed jurisdiction in New York.
The Appellate Division upheld jurisdiction without relying on arti-
cle 28. The carrier, British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines
(BCPA), moved to dismiss on grounds that (a) it was a foreign cor-
poration not doing business in New York and therefore was not
subject to the court's jurisdiction, and (b) proper service of process
on it had not been made. Plaintiff contended that jurisdiction ex-
isted by virtue of article 28, since the destination was New York. 9
The lower court sustained this contention. The New York Appel-
late Division found, however, that BCPA's general sales agency
agreement with British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) sat-
isfied the requirement for "doing business in New York"; that ser-
vice on BOAC in these circumstances was sufficient; and that in
personam jurisdiction existed apart from the application of article
28.70 There is some doubt about the constitutionality of an exten-
sion of jurisdiction by treaty, particularly in cases not otherwise
within the due process limitations on jurisdiction, and this may
68. 2 Misc. 2d 260, 149 N.Y.S.2d 335 (N.Y.Sup. Ct. 1956), aff'd, 3 A.D.2d 9, 157
N.Y.S.2d 884 (1956), aff'd mem., 3 N.Y.2d 1003, 147 N.E.2d 732, 170 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1957).
69. Berner, 2 Misc. 2d at 263.
70. Id. at 264.
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well account for the court's avoidance of the subject.7" Thus far
"the only accomplishment of Article 28 [has been] to preclude ju-
risdiction over foreign carriers in a certain number of cases where
an action could have been brought if Warsaw had not been appli-
cable. '72 This is not much of a bargain for the passenger.
VIII. NOTICE
Historically, one of the ways that courts have avoided applying
the limitations is by finding that the passenger had inadequate no-
tice. This frequently involved a finding that the Warsaw Conven-
tion's ticketing requirements were not met. Under the Warsaw
Convention, contractual knowledge has been held satisfied by
timely delivery of a ticket containing adequate notice. The district
court in In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia stated that
Liability limitation of the Warsaw Convention is one based upon
contract between the parties to the contract of carriage; how-
ever, for the liability limitation to be effective, there must be a
contractual acceptance, either actual or legal, of the limitation
by the party against whom the limitation is sought to be
imposed .7
Other recent cases bearing on this point are Georgakis v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc.7 4 in which it was held that a Greek seaman who
could not read the English notice on his domestic ticket was not
adequately notified; and Manion v. Pan American Airways, Inc.75
in which there is an extensive discussion of the requirement of
physical delivery of the ticket contract prior to commencing travel.
If the ticket is delivered, however, English speaking passengers are
generally held to have imputed knowledge of the ticket contract.
Imputed knowledge is a legal fiction in which a person is held
responsible for knowledge that is open to his discovery and that
the court believes he has a duty to discover. 6 With regard to the
ticket contract, the courts may be setting too rigid a standard for
the average passenger.
71. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 526 n.113.
72. Id. at 526.
73. In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 462 F. Supp. at 1114.
74. 512 F. Supp. 330 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
75. 105 Misc. 2d 27, 430 N.Y.S.2d 486 (1980), modified, 439 N.Y.S.2d 6, 80 A.D.2d 303
(1981).
76. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 683 (5th ed. 1979).
77. John J. Kennelly, a prominent aviation expert, expresses this opinion:
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Commentators have noted the apparent preferential treatment
of the international carriers at the expense of passengers, other
carriers, the aircraft manufacturers, and even the U.S. Govern-
ment .7  Let us now examine the policy considerations underlying
this advantageous treatment.
IX. POLICY
In the fifty years since the United States signed the Warsaw
Convention, numerous opinions have articulated the policy consid-
erations underlying the limitations of liability. For the most part
policy rationale divides into two main categories: protection of the
fledgling airlines and uniformity of the rules with respect to inter-
national law.
Airlines occupy a unique position in the scheme of transporta-
tion. This is evidenced by the term applied to an international air-
line, "flag carrier, ' '79 and the fact that despite compelling economic
considerations, only the Scandinavian countries have combined to
form a joint venture airline. In short, airlines are a source of na-
tional pride and a method of world wide advertising; so much so
that many countries maintain their national airline with subsidies
in the face of staggering deficits that would bankrupt any other
corporation. In addition, when the Convention was first drafted in
the 1920's, there was little aviation insurance; the fatality rate was
45 per 100 million passenger miles;80 and a single accident had the
potential of wiping out a fledgling company. In 1934, when the
United States adhered, the world was in a deep depression, busi-
ness was stagnated, and the average annual wage was $1,137, in an
economy with twenty to twenty-five percent unemployment."1 This
We think that we are safe in saying that virtually none of the general public, and
very few lawyers or judges, realize that their families might be limited to
$8,291.87 or $16,582.00, or $75,000, if they are killed in an airline crash, even
though the accident occurs in the United States, if the ticket calls for interna-
tional travel.
Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 66, at 133.
78. Clifford W. Gardner, in an article entitled So You Are Going to Fly to London,
offers the opinion that, "From an airline's or airline insurer's point of view, I think this
treaty is the greatest writing since the advent of paper money." Gardner, Some Legal Ad-
vice: So You're Going to Fly to London, 43 A.B.A.J. 412, 413 (1951).
79. Federal Air Regulations 14 C.F.R. § 275 (1985).
80. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 498 n.3 (citing the 1965 ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE ICAO COUNCIL TO THE ICAO ASSEMBLY 13). The 1965 figure was 0.55 fatalities per
100 million passenger miles.
81. Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 66, at 120.
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is in stark contrast to the situation today. Some of the larger air-
lines have assets measured in the billions of dollars; 2 the fatality
rate is approximately 0.41 per 100 million passenger miles;s3 and
the average per capita income is higher than the allowable recov-
ery under the basic Warsaw Convention.8 4 Today we find finan-
cially strong companies with extensive insurance coverage and a
liability exposure that has been reduced by a factor of over 100 to
1, who continue to hide behind the protection of a treaty from an-
other era.8 5
Even if protecting fledgling airlines were a rational and valid
reason for abrogating an individual's right to security in the early
years of the airline industry, the necessity has long since disap-
peared. The maintenance of government imposed protection under
present conditions is little more than an ill-disguised perpetuation
of droit du Seigneur on a subservient populace.
The second major reason advanced in support of the Conven-
tion's liability limitations is maintaining uniformity of rules in in-
ternational law. Let us disregard for a moment the lack of uni-
formity evidenced by the patchwork of rules under the Warsaw
Convention as modified by the Hague Protocol and waived by the
Montreal Agreement. The basic goal, uniformity, is still valid to-
day, perhaps more so than when the Convention was drafted. But
there are many ways to bring divergent systems into uniformity.
One or another system can be adopted in its entirety, several sys-
tems can be merged into a compromise solution, or the basic tenets
of the conferees can become a starting point for an entirely new
system drafted ab initio.
The United States faced a fait accompli when it joined the
82. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 1982 Second Qtr. Interim Report 3 (n.d.) (the report showed
a total property and equipment of $3,607,981,000).
83. This is the approximate statistical average for the years 1971 - 1981. Since the ma-
jor air carriers had no fatalities in 1980 and 1981, this figure was zero for those years.
I.C.A.O. Annual Report 13 (1983).
84. Per capita income rises 10.7% to nearly $10,500, Miami Herald, Sept. 12, 1982, at
5A, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Per Capita].
85. The-impact of this antique treaty is best assessed in a hypothetical example. Imag-
ine a Lockheed 1011 with 293 seats, all filled, flying on a route where the Montreal Agree-
ment applies. If the aircraft crashes, killing all on board, and is completely demolished, it
will cost the carrier (or more accurately the carrier's insurer) between forty and forty-five
million dollars to replace the aircraft. The maximum exposure for liability to passengers,
however, is $21,975,000-about half the cost of the aircraft. Under the basic Convention, the
total liability of the carrier for death or injury of passengers is $2,431,900, or less than one-
sixteenth the value of the aircraft.
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Warsaw Convention nations almost five years after the drafting.
Before joining it should have determined whether its basic tenets
were met. One tenet is best expressed by Rousseau:
Is the welfare of a single citizen any less the common cause than
that of the whole state?... If we are to understand that it is
lawful for the government to sacrifice an innocent man for the
good of the multitude, then I hold this maxim as one of the most
execrable rules tyranny ever invented, the greatest falsehood
that can be advanced, the most dangerous admission that can be
made, and a direct contradiction of the fundamental rules of
society."'
Rousseau's philosophy is as persuasive today as when it was writ-
ten in 1755. The limitation provisions of the Warsaw Convention,
however, seem to have neglected this basis tenet. Rousseau was an
early advocate of the Social Contract Theory, an eighteenth cen-
tury construct which reached its modern fruition in John Rawls' A
Theory of Justice.87 This theory is probably the one which most
closely approximates the average American's ideas of government
and justice. 88
According to Social Contract Theory, one has the choice of be-
longing to many societies or adhering to many contracts. Some of
these have hierarchical relationships and some do not. Some are
voluntary and some not so voluntary. One can belong to either the
Elks Club or the Shrine or both without conflict between them. If
the requirements of either become noxious one can withdraw with
impunity. The Masons and the Catholic Church have at various
times been mutually exclusive, but in United States judicial his-
tory neither has been mandatory, so one has the freedom to choose
between them or to forgo both. If, however, one chooses to be the
86. J. ROUSSEAU, ON POLITICAL EcONOMY, para. 32 (1755).
87. J. RAWLS, A THEORY op JUSTICE (1971). Rawls modernized and brought to a higher
order of abstraction the traditional theory of the Social Contract as represented by Locke,
Rousseau, and Kant. He has effectively reworked the theory in the area of historical valid-
ity, the most prominent objection to Locke's version.
88. Of the three most common social theories, Divine Right, Utilitarian, and Social
Contract, the Social Contract is the one which most accurately describes the American sys-
tem. Some elements of Utilitarianism are certainly present, and the government branches
occasionally urge Divine Right. See, e.g., United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 318 (1936)(discussing source of power to regulate foreign affairs). Note, however,
the second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence, particularly the second sentence:
"That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just
powers from the consent of the governed,. This is a classic historical description of the
Social Contract.
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citizen of a state, by necessity and force of arms, one accepts the
contract of federal citizenship, which by federal fiat is preemptive
and paramount. Until recently that was as far as the hierarchy
went. However, in recent years, there has been a disconcerting ten-
dency to take the citizenry into a sort of World Citizenship, subor-
dinating United States citizens' legitimate rights and interests to
those of foreign countries, some of whom are militantly nationalis-
tic and unconcerned with reciprocal concessions. The most marked
difference in the United States and these countries is the govern-
ment's attitude toward the citizen. In the United States the sover-
eignty resides in the citizenry and the individual and his inaliena-
ble rights are prior to the state. In many countries with a history of
feudalism, the primary concern is the state. The citizen is consid-
ered to be nothing more than a vassal. "The Bill of Rights, the
protective shield of natural rights, marks the greatest difference
between this country and those authoritarian states subscribing to
materialistic statism." 9 These authoritarian states can afford the
loss of a few citizens at $8300 each and consider the elevation of
the maximum to $75,000 as "extortion." Shortly after the Montreal
Agreement, one commentator noted that:
There has been wide dissatisfaction with the carrier Interim
Warsaw Liability Agreement (Montreal Agreement). The fore-
most criticism by both governments and carriers is that it was
forced upon the world by the brute strength of the United
States. The position of most governments in the Montreal Con-
ference on Warsaw was that the United States denunciation was
an extortion, since it was generally conceded that the convention
could not be maintained without United States participation.
Under-developed nations have been particularly critical,
describing the United States action as a ploy calculated to take
from the poor to give to the rich.90
One wonders whose purpose it was to take from the poor to give to
the rich. The purpose of the United States' action was the protec-
tion of individuals at the expense of multinational insurance com-
panies, airline corporations, and governments.
89. Vogts v. Guerrette, 142 Colo. 527, 549, 351 P.2d 851, 863 (1960)(Frantz, J.,
dissenting).
90. Stephen, The Adequate Award in International Aviation Accidents, 1966 INs. L.J.
711, 732.
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X. EQUITABLE CONTRACT
Some argument has been made that the limitations result in
an equitable exchange. In exchange for a limit on his recovery, the
passenger receives a shift in the burden of proof of negligence.
Some of the principals responsible for the original adherence to the
Convention considered this a fair exchange. "The principle of plac-
ing the burden on the carrier to show lack of negligence in interna-
tional air transportation in order to escape liability, seems to be
reasonable in view of the difficulty which a passenger has in estab-
lishing the cause of an accident in air transportation."91 Whether
the value attributed to the shift in the burden of proof was suffi-
cient to offset a limit in the allowable recovery to $8,300 is ques-
tionable. Assuming, arguendo, that this exchange was an equitable
one, the changes of the last fifty years have constantly been in
favor of the carrier and against the passenger. The allowable recov-
ery has been whittled away by inflation and social progress until it
is negligible. Despite frantic patchwork attempts by the Hague
Protocol and the Montreal Agreement which went far toward de-
stroying the uniformity of the Convention, the maximum recovery
allowed will cover only a small fraction of the possible exposure to
medical bills. In 1934, when the United States adhered to the con-
vention, someone who earned $8,300 was economically well off. To-
day that figure is below the per capita income of forty-six of our
states."2
Other developments have had a tendency to reduce the value
of what the passenger received in the exchange. Juridical tendency
in the application of res ipsa loquitur93 doctrine has brought us
almost to the point of strict liability in air crash cases.94 In addi-
91. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting a Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules, S. Exec. Doc. No. G, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) (presidential
transmittal of the Convention delivered by Secretary of State Cordell Hull) [hereinafter
Message from the President).
92. Per Capita, supra note 84 (article providing a list of the per capita income of the
various states, only four fell below $8,300).
93. A. LOWENFELD, supra note 2, at 7-106.
94. It is interesting to trace the development of this tendency in Prosser's Text on
Torts. In the first edition, published in 1941, Prosser states:
As a matter of common knowledge there are many accidents which may often
occur without anyone's fault. . . .In the present state of development of avia-
tion, most courts consider that airplane crashes are to be placed in this category.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 296 (Ist ed. 1941).
In the 1955 edition Prosser states:
The earlier cases dealing with aviation took the position that there was not yet
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tion, suits on breach of warranty have furnished a theory of recov-
ery unavailable to passengers fifty years ago." Aside from the ju-
risprudential changes, technology has improved to the point where
it is possible to reconstruct the last moments of even a non-surviv-
able crash by the use of voice and flight data recorders. Govern-
ment agencies determine and publish the roximate cause.96
The overall effect of these developments is that the passenger
gives up a substantial right against the airline in exchange for a
juristic privilege which is no longer of substantial value to him.
The one exception to this lack of value is in those cases in which
the plaintiff has no cause of action,97 or the cause logically should
have been directed at some other defendant than the airline.98 Al-
lowing these actions to be maintained in the name of equity of con-
such common knowledge and experience of its hazards as to permit. . . a conclu-
sion [as to negligence] from the unexplained crash of a plane. It is only the more
recent decisions which have held that the safety record now established justifies
the application of res ipsa loquitur.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 203 (2d ed. 1955).
And in the 1964 edition Prosser states:
[A]I1 of the later cases now agree that the safety record justifies the application
of res ipsa loquitur to an unexplained airplane crash, or even to the complete
disappearance of a plane.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 220-21 & nn.28-30 (3d ed. 1964). Since 1964
the language has remained essentially unchanged, and appears on page 246 of the 5th
edition.
95. See generally W. KEETON & W. PROSSER, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS §§ 95-104 (1984). See also Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 66, at 180 (Kennelly states:
"When the Warsaw Convention Treaty was initially adopted, manufacturers and component
part makers were not liable to passengers, the 'reason' being the absence of 'privity' between
the manufacturers and the passengers. At that time, the doctrine of strict liability of manu-
facturers had not been conceived, let alone born.").
96. The opinion portion of these reports is not admissible evidence, and the experts
who compile them are prohibited by F.A.R. 435.4 from rendering expert opinion testimony
in air crash cases. A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW 18-7 (Sept. 1985 Cum. Supp.).
What is admissible are the facts and fact patterns from which these conclusions were drawn.
Id.
97. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir. 1971) (MacDonald fell
in the baggage claim area after debarking from an international flight. There was no indica-
tion as to why she fell, and no evidence of negligence on the part of the carrier, and plaintiff
claimed liability without fault under Warsaw as modified by Montreal. The Court of Ap-
peals found that the international transportation had been completed and that the passen-
ger was no longer covered by the Warsaw Convention).
98. See, e.g., Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975) (Two Pales-
tinian terrorists attacked a line of passengers waiting to board a TWA flight from Athens to
New York. Plaintiffs sued the airline, which had very little to do with security, because of
the ease with which this could be done under the Montreal Agreement. The court found
that the passengers, who were "embarking," were engaged in international transportation,
and TWA was absolutely liable up to the limit of $75,000 regardless of fault).
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tract only works further hardship on the plaintiff with a legitimate
cause against the carrier, or for that matter, on the uninjured pas-
senger who helps defray the costs with the price of his ticket.
American opinion has never been very favorable toward the
Warsaw Convention. Evidence of this negative opinion can be
found in the failure of the Senate to ratify the Hague Protocol.
Insurers, as well, were aware of the criticisms leveled at the con-
vention and the fact that ratification in 1934 was dependent on the
unusual political situation at that time.99
In summation, the injured international passenger's vested
right of action against the carrier that injured him may have been
so severely diminished as to constitute a "taking" of this right by
the government through its treaty power. If there is not adequate
compensation, such taking may contravene the United States
Constitution.'00
XI. CONSTITUTIONALITY
Only a few lower court cases have considered and favorably
resolved issues raising the constitutionality of the Warsaw Conven-
99. The minutes of the meeting of the International Union of Aviation Insurers held in
Brussels 11 & 12 May, 1949, reflected an awareness of the tenuous position of the
Convention.
As to the revision of the Warsaw Convention, he wanted to make the Ameri-
can position clear. American insurers had had plenty of experience in dealing
with the Convention and were fully alive to its defects, but generally speaking, it
had enabled settlements to be made at lower figures than the average for non-
Convention cases and its validity had been upheld and affirmed by the Ameri-
can courts in a series of cases. There were three dangers about revision. The first
was that although revision would no doubt cure some of the defects, it might
introduce new ones. In the second place, there was quite a serious danger that a
revised Convention might not be ratified by the American Senate, since the Con-
vention contained several principles which were completely repugnant to Amer-
ican law and the original Convention owed its easy passage through the Senate
to the exceptionally wide powers exercised by President Roosevelt at that time.
Finally, even if the revised Convention were passed, it would necessitate fighting
a series of actions in the courts to establish its validity and the existing decisions
would be rendered valueless.
Reprinted in The Insurance Industry: Hearings on S. Res. 231 Before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 487
(1958) (paraphrasing statement of George G. Orr, Director of Claims for United States Avia-
tion Underwriters, Inc., where he discussed the difference of opinion between the European
Underwriters, who were urging revision of the convention, and the American Underwriters,
who opposed revision).
100. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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tion. In Pierre v. Eastern Airlines,"'1 the district court found that
the treaty did not violate the right to trial by jury guaranteed by
the seventh amendment. The court held that "trial by jury" con-
sisted of a panel of twelve men, neither more nor less; that the jury
should be the trier of fact; that the trial should be in the presence
of and under the supervision of a judge empowered to instruct the
jurors as to the law; and that the verdict must be unanimous. So
long as these elements are preserved, there is no violation of the
constitutional right to trial by jury. Hence the Warsaw Convention
does not violate the seventh amendment. 10 2 There was no appeal,
and the decision stands. An argument could be made that the con-
vention interferes with the jury's perogative of trying facts, includ-
ing liability and damages, but this is a weak theory of unconstitu-
tionality of the convention.
Another lower court case of considerably more interest than
Pierre is Burdell v. Canadian Pacific Airlines,03 an Illinois Circuit
Court case with two opinions by Judge Bua. The history of these
two opinions sheds some light on the dearth of opinions addressing
the constitutionality issue. Canadian Pacific was attempting to
limit liability recovery for Burdell's widow and three children to
$8,300 and to force them to sue in Singapore, the origin and desti-
nation of his journey. Plaintiff's attorney, John Kennelly, filed a
brief alleging (1) inapplicability of the convention on the grounds
that Singapore was not a "High Contracting Party"; (2) insuffi-
ciency of the warning contained in the ticket; and (3) unconstitu-
tionality of the limitation and restriction of venue clauses of the
convention. 04 Judge Bua, in a closely reasoned and powerful opin-
ion, found for the plaintiffs on all three points. 0 5 Canadian Pacific
did not appeal, but settled for $215,000, or about twenty-six times
the amount that they had sought as a limit. 0 6 They also filed a
motion requesting withdrawal of the ruling on constitutionality as
"unnecessary."'01 7 Judge Bua granted this motion and issued a new
opinion in which he stated that although he found plaintiff's argu-
101. 152 F. Supp. 486 (D.N.J. 1957).
102. The court also found that Eastern's co-defendant, Cecil C. Foxworth, was not pro-
tected by the convention. Id.
103. 10 Av. CAS. (CCH) 18,151 (Cir. Ct. Ill. 1968), subsequent opinion, 11 Av. CAS.
(CCH) 17,353 (1969) (withdrawing ruling on unconstitutionality).
104. 10 Av. CAS. (CCH) at 18,152-53.
105. Id. at 18,160-61.
106. 1968 U.S. Av. R. 1133, unnumbered footnote on title page. (No information on the
settlement and subsequent motion appears in the CCH reporter).
107. Id.
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ment on the constitutionality issue persuasive, 0 8 he felt con-
strained to forgo ruling on that issue, in light of his finding that
there was no international transportation as defined by the con-
vention. 109 In the context of individualism and the preservation of
individual rights evidenced throughout the fifties and sixties, it is
clear that the airlines, beneficiaries of this archaic windfall, would
go to great lengths to preserve their advantage and prevent appel-
late review, particularly review of a compelling, articulate finding
against them such as Judge Bua's.
Unfortunately for those who have come to expect the courts to
protect individual rights, the Supreme Court seems to be moving
toward less protection of the individual from government and big
business."' Justices Burger, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, generally
considered the Court's conservative branch,"' have been criticized
for adding "unnecessary" opinions on the merits of cases decided
on narrow procedural grounds." 2 This abrupt swing to the right
108. The summary of the constitutionality issue in Judge Bua's first opinion stated:
Provisions of the Warsaw Convention that would restrict the rights of par-
ties to bring an action against an air carrier in a court of the United States,
which would otherwise have jurisdiction, and that would restrict the damages
recoverable in the event of an accident to approximately $8,300 violate the due
process and equal protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution and are unconsti-
tutional. Such provisions are arbitrary, irresponsible, capricious and undefen-
sible when they attempt to impose a damage limitation of considerably less than
the undisputed pecuniary losses and damages involved, and such unjustifible
preferential treatment of international air carriers is unconstitutional.
Burdell, 10 Av. CAS. (CCH) at 18,151.
In a letter to U.S. Av. R. dated May 3, 1971, Judge Bua stated that although he had
granted the motion to withdraw that portion of the opinion declaring the treaty unconstitu-
tional on the basis that it was unnecessary to the opinion, the court was still persuaded that
the venue and damage limitations portions of the treaty were unconstitutional. Burdell,
1968 U.S. Av. R. at 1133, n.*.
109. 11 Av. CAS. (CCH) 17,353.
110. Justice: High Court Veers to the Right, Miami Herald, Sept. 20, 1984, at 1A, col. 1
[hereinafter cited as Justice].
111. Hager, High Court: An Issue in Campaign, L.A.Times, Sept. 22, 1984, at 1A, col. 1
[hereinafter cited as Hager, High Court].
112. This criticism came not from the liberal side, but from Justice Stevens who is
generally considered a moderate. Hager, Justices' Tendency to 'Go Public' With Criticism
of Each Other Arouses Concern, L.A.Times, Sept. 22, 1984, at 8A, col. 1 [hereinafter cited
as Hager, Tendency to Go Public]; Hager, High Court, supra note 111.
An unprecedented series of public statements by Justices has given some insight into
the dynamics of the Court's movement to the right. Justice Blackmun accused the Court of
"moving to the right" and "going where it wants to go... by hook or by crook." Address by
Justice Blackmun, Cosmos Club, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 18, 1984), reported in Hager,
Tendency to Go Public, supra; Justice, supra note 110. Justice Marshall, addressing the
judges of the Second Circuit, pointed out several rulings which he said showed a "very dis-
turbing pattern" of denying effective remedies to people who believe their rights have been
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and loss of concern with individual rights may have caused the in-
ternational airlines to decide that the time is ripe to allow the
question of the Warsaw Convention's constitutionality to wend its
way before the Court. Or perhaps the Court itself is "going out of
its way" to make new law as Justice Stevens has suggested." 3
After fifty years of silence on the Warsaw Convention, the Su-
preme Court has issued two opinions on the subject in the last
year. As previously noted, the Franklin Mint decision has ominous
portent for international travelers; the other case, while quite nar-
row, is of the same ilk.
The Court's holding in Saks v. Air France"" turned on the
definition of "accident" in article 17 of the convention. Valerie
Saks suffered a permanent loss of hearing in her left ear while
traveling as an international passenger on Air France. The trial
court granted summary judgment for Air France because she was
unable to prove malfunction of the aircraft pressurization sys-
tem.' The Ninth Circuit reversed and held that a showing of mal-
function or abnormality in the aircraft's operation is not a prereq-
uisite for liability under the Warsaw Convention."' The court in
its analysis cited dicta from MacDonald v. Air Canada"7 that the
finding of an "accident" must precede the imposition of liability
without fault.18 The MacDonald court held that debarkation was
complete and the Warsaw Convention did not apply."9 Conse-
quently, analysis in the decision of MacDonald's failure to meet
the burdens of the convention were superflous. Troubled by the
similarity of Air France's assertion of "normal operation" to the
defense of "due care" (supposedly waived by the Montreal Agree-
ment), the Ninth Circuit searched for and found a workable defini-
tion of "aircraft accident" in the Convention on International Avi-
ation. 20 An aircraft accident was defined as:
an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which
violated. Hager, Tendency to Go Public, supra. Justice Stevens, speaking at Northwestern
University, accused the Court of "going out of its way" to make new law in rights cases. Id.
113. Id.
114. 724 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 1338 (1985).
115. Saks, 724 F.2d at 1384.
116. Id.
117. 439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir. 1971).
118. Id. at 1385.
119. MacDonald, 439 F.2d at 1405.
120. The Convention on International Aviation is a multi-party treaty to which the
United States is a signatory. Saks, 724 F.2d at 1385.
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takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft
with the intention of flight and all such persons have dis-
embarked, and in which any person suffers death or serious in-
jury, or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage.''
Since Saks had suffered serious injury, the event met the criteria
of this definition of accident and the Ninth Circuit held that Air
France was liable for her damages.
The Supreme Court reversed and held that liability under ar-
ticle 17 arises only if a passenger's injury is caused by an unex-
pected or unusual event or happening that is external to the pas-
senger, and not where the injury results from the passenger's own
internal reaction to the usual, normal, and expected operation of
the aircraft.1 21
Saks limits recovery by injured parties who have a legitimate
claim against airlines. This limitation arises when there is a control
problem or malfunction in an aircraft pressurization system which
affects one passenger seriously and which other passengers, be-
cause of superior physical tolerance, either do not notice or disre-
gard. Saks could not establish that there had been a malfunction of
the pressurization system.12 Although she was injured by a func-
tion of the aircraft, the Court placed on her the burden of proving
that the operation which injured her was unusual or unexpected.'2 4
The data necessary to do this (instrument readings, control set-
tings, etc.) are in the control of the airline. Without access to them
or evidence that another passenger was affected by the pressuriza-
tion, her burden was insurmountable. Resolving this difficulty of
proof was one of the advantages that the passenger was to gain in
exchange for giving up her right to a full recovery.12 5 Now the
Court has rescinded that advantage. It is unfair to revoke rights
granted by the treaty without restoring the rights that were taken.
The issue in Saks came before the Supreme Court because of
a conflict of opinion between the Third and Ninth Circuits."2 6 An-
other such split has apparently arisen between the Second and
Fifth Circuits on whether or not the $75,000 limitation of the Mon-
121. 49 C.F.R. § 830.2 (1984).
122. Air France v. Saks, 105 S. Ct. 1338 (1985), rev'g, 724 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1984).
123. Id. at 1340.
124. Id. at 1341.
125. Message from the President, supra note 91, at 3-4.
126. Air France v. Saks, 105 S. Ct. 1338, 1340 (1985). See also Saks, 724 F.2d 1383,
1389 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
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treal Agreement precludes the award of pre-judgment interest
above that amount. In Domangue v. Eastern Airlines,27 the Fifth
Circuit found that it did not; in O'Rourke v. Eastern Airlines,"8
the Second Circuit held that it did. The two circuits came to oppo-
site conclusions about whether a purpose of the convention was to
expedite settling claims arising from air crashes. The Fifth Circuit
found that expedition of claims was a valid purpose of the Conven-
tion and that pre-judgment interest advanced that purpose.12 9 The
Second Circuit found that although the United States interests in
the convention were unclear, it was apparent that one of them was
not expediting the settlement of claims. 3 0 Predictably, the Second
Circuit then held that pre-judgment interest was not to be
awarded if it caused the judgment to exceed the limitation.' 3 '
Judge Pratt in his dissent analyzed the time value of money and
concluded that by putting off payment for six and a half years, the
airline earned $31,604.79 in interest on money that belonged to the
plaintiff at the instant of the accident. Hence the cost was not
$75,000 at all, but no more than $43,395.21, and perhaps signifi-
cantly less. 32
These courts did not have before them the question of limita-
tion of the recovery of the plaintiff. Both cases arose from the
same accident, the crash of Eastern Airlines Flight 66 at John F.
Kennedy International Airport on June 24, 1975.11 The United
States Government, a second defendant, became liable because of
the failure of one of the air controllers to notify Eastern of the
micro-burst 4 which caused the crash. 35 In Domangue the govern-
ment was assessed $564,446.50.13" In O'Rourke the court offered
the plaintiff a conditional remittur of $779,981 or a new trial on
damages. 37 With an award of this amount, the government would
127. 722 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1984).
128. 730 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1984).
129. Domangue, 722 F.2d at 261.
130. O'Rourke, 730 F.2d at 852-54 & n.20.
131. Id. at 853.
132. Id. at 859-60 (Pratt, J., dissenting).
133. O'Rourke, 730 F.2d at 845; Domangue, 722 F.2d at 257.
134. A micro-burst is a meteorological phenomena characterized by intense down drafts
of up to 75 meters per second. It is frequently associated with thunderstorms. See generally
T. FUJITA, THE DOWNBURST (1985).
135. In re Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy Int'l Airport on June 24, 1975, 407 F.
Supp. 244 (J.P.M.D.L. 1976), approved, 479 F. Supp. 1118 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 635 F.2d
67 (2d Cir. 1980).
136. Domangue, 722 F.2d at 258.
137. O'Rourke, 730 F.2d at 859.
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pay $704,981. Eastern would only pay $75,000 (either with or with-
out interest) in each case. 3 8 The reports of these cases do not con-
tain information on the allocation of liability, but it is unlikely
that the government is ten times more culpable than the airline for
merely failing to warn them of bad weather. It is pertinent to note
that Eastern Airlines had other notions of the equitable allocation
of culpability; in a pretrial agreement they agreed to a 60/40 split
with the United States.'39
In another case resulting from this same crash"10 the court
points out the anomaly of the government's position.
Surprisingly, Stratis, who could not be affected by a limitation
of Eastern's liability because he has the United States as a re-
sponsible defendant, is the only one of the parties who argues in
his appellate brief that the Convention is inapplicable. The
United States, which had agreed to a split of any damages with
Eastern, has had no need to discuss the point in its brief.""
Since the United States paid more than its fair share in these
three cases, maybe that is its intent. Under a fifth amendment the-
ory of compensation for property taken by the government, awards
of the courts that exceeded the limitations would be paid by the
United States. Such a theory was advanced by the Ninth Circuit in
its opinion remanding In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia."2 The
district court applied California law, held that the Warsaw Con-
vention did not apply, and did not reach the constitutional ques-
tions.'43 The Ninth Circuit held that California law was preempted
because it interfered with the Congressional intent evidenced in
the Convention."4 Thus it was necessary to address the plaintiff's
three constitutional challenges to the limitations: (1) that the con-
vention is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to deprive them of sub-
stantive due process; (2) that it deprives them of equal protection
of the laws; and (3) that it impermissibly burdens their constitu-
tional right to travel." 5 The first two arguments are similar to the
138. O'Rourke, 730 F.2d at 845; Domangue, 722 F.2d at 258.
139. In re Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy Int'l Airport on June 24, 1975, 635
F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1979).
140. Stratis v. Eastern Airlines, 682 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1982).
141. Id. at 409.
142. 684 F.2d 1301, 1310 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'g, 462 F. Supp. 1114 (C.D. Cal. 1978). See
supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text (discussion of additional aspects of this case).
143. In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 684 F.2d at 1306.
144. Id. at 1308.
145. Id. at 1309.
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arguments advanced in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmen-
tal Study Group.46 Duke Power was concerned with the constitu-
tionality of the Price-Anderson Act, 147 which sets a limit on the
maximum liability for injury resulting from nuclear power plant
accidents. In Duke Power the Supreme Court held that the Price-
Anderson Act, as economic regulation under the Commerce Clause,
would not violate due process unless it was arbitrary or irra-
tional." 8 The Ninth Circuit did not discuss equal protection fur-
ther, but extrapolated that article 22 of the convention, like the
Price-Anderson Act, is economic regulation which is constitutional
under the commerce clause unless arbitrary or unreasonable." 9
Since the question was not before the court, it was unnecessary to
determine whether article 22 was in fact arbitrary or unreasonable.
The Ninth Circuit briefly touched upon equal protection again, as
well as rationality and unreasonableness, in analyzing the right to
travel argument. The insurance required to meet the additional
burden if the limitations did not apply would be insignificant. 5 0
The cost to airlines of additional insurance would be less than the
cost to individual passengers of purchasing trip insurance.'" Un-
like the situation in Duke Power, where the potential liability was
beyond the ability of private insurance companies to absorb, insur-
ance is available, and the domestic carriers, which are not pro-
tected by the Warsaw Convention or similar legislation, are able to
obtain it. 152 After analyzing these factors, the court concluded:
"[T]he plaintiffs' due process and right-to-travel arguments, while
substantial, would fail if another remedy were available that would
provide them with full compensation. We find that such a remedy
is available under the Tucker Act, if the liability limitation consti-
tutes a "taking" under the fifth amendment.' ' 3
Since the lower court proceeding had evidentiary errors' 5 ' and
did not reach the issues of notice and ticket delivery,' 55 the Ninth
146. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976).
148. Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 83.
149. In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 684 F.2d at 1309.
150. Id. at 1310, citing, ICAO, 2 Special ICAO Meeting on Limits for Passengers
Under the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol 72-173 (1966).
151. L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 11.01151 (1975).
152. In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 684 F.2d at 1310.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1305, 1313. Since the district court held that the Warsaw Convention did not
apply, it excluded evidence on the issue of willful misconduct as irrelevant.
155. Id. at 1306 n.3.
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Circuit did not reach the question of whether or not there had
been a taking. It remanded the case for resolution of the eviden-
tiary errors and findings consistent with its opinion. The question
of taking is properly one for the Court of Claims when and if the
Warsaw Convention Limitation is applied to these plaintiffs."5 6
The Ninth Circuit gave short shrift to equal protection, since
the question was not before it. No discussion of constitutionality,
however, would be complete without some scrutiny of equal pro-
tection of the laws. "Equal protection to all is the basic principle
on which rests justice under the law .... This clause ... means...
that all persons ... shall be treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions, both in privileges conferred and in liabilities
imposed."15' 7
The most obvious case of unequal treatment under the War-
saw Convention is that of two passengers sitting side by side on a
domestic flight. One of them is traveling between two domestic cit-
ies, and the other is continuing a journey which began outside the
country. The aircraft crashes and both are injured. The intra-coun-
try passenger may recover damages to the extent that a jury finds
that he is entitled to them; the international passenger is limited
to whichever modification of Warsaw applies. Senator Butler,
speaking of this hypothetical case, stated unequivocally, "In my
opinion, it shows conclusively that we have already, by treaty, cut
across the right of the American people to a full jury trial in the
event of accident or death in a case such as that stated."1 58
The passenger is not always the one who suffers from the ap-
plication of this preferential treatment for international airlines. It
can be the aircraft manufacturer, the component part maker, a do-
mestic airline, or even, as we have seen, the U.S. Government. Sup-
pose, for instance, that a passenger covered by the Warsaw Con-
vention was aboard the plane that crashed in the Florida
Everglades in December, 1972.19 Suppose, also, that his medical
156. Id. at 1315-16.
157. 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 502 (1956).
158. 100 CONG. REC. 1009 (daily ed., Jan. 29, 1954)(statement of Sen. Butler).
159. In re Air Crash Disaster at Florida Everglades on December 29, 1972, 360 F. Supp.
1394 (J.P.M.D.L. June 28, 1973), subsequent opinion, 368 F. Supp. 812 (J.P.M.D.L. Dec. 14,
1973); subsequent opinion aff'g unreported D.C.S.D. Fla. ruling, 549 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir.
1977). These opinions resulted from a Lockheed 1011 crash which occurred outside Miami
on December 29, 1972. The flight crew was distracted by a malfunction in the landing gear
indicator and failed to properly monitor their altitude. A second malfunction in the
autopilot allowed the aircraft to deviate from the selected altitude without the normal an-
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bills and damages were $300,000. Assume that liability was as-
sessed at seventy percent for the carrier, ten percent for the manu-
facturer, and twenty percent for the government controller.16 ° With
an award of $300,000, the carrier would be assessed $210,000, the
manufacturer $30,000, and the government $60,000. The carrier
pleads the affirmative defense of the Warsaw Convention limita-
tion, $75,000. That leaves $135,000 unpaid out of its share. Under
the doctrine of joint and several liability, the manufacturer be-
comes liable for an additional $45,000 ($75,000 total), and the gov-
ernment is obligated to pay a total of $150,000, or one half Of an
accident for which they were twenty percent responsible. 61 Equal
protection? No. Rational justification? Probably not. The same ba-
sic concepts would apply in a collision between a general aviation
aircraft and an international flight, or between a domestic and an
international flight.162 If the international airlines may contractu-
ally limit their damages regardless of their negligence, similar pro-
tection should be granted to aircraft manufacturers, domestic air-
lines, private aircraft owners and operators, maintenance
companies, air taxis, the U.S. Government, and everyone else con-
nected with aviation.
nunciator warning to the flight crew. The government air controller noticed the altitude
deviation, but his communication to the flight crew was ambiguous and failed to alert them
to the danger. A subsequent investigation found that the autopilot malfunction was caused
by the installation of non-compatible parts which allowed the remote possibility of failure.
Further investigation revealed that the manufacturer was aware that the parts were incom-
patible, but considered the possibility of failure so remote that they failed to inform the
carrier. Consequently, the proximate cause of the accident rested on the combined negli-
gence of three parties.
160. Actually the airline conceded liability, and the government and the manufacturer
agreed to contribution without admitting liability. In re Air Crash Disaster at Florida Ever-
glades on December 29, 1972, 549 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1977). The percentages were given in a
lecture on Aircraft Accident Litigation presented by one of the team of defense attorneys for
the airline, and sponsored by Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University at Miami, Feb. 1980.
161. The solution given is only one of a complicated choice available to the trial court.
This example and the one that follows are computed on a simplified version of the Califor-
nia rule for joint and several liability espoused in American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior
Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 586, 578 P.2d 899, 903, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 186 (1978).
162. As a hypothetical case, suppose you own a light twin-engined aircraft and your
daughter is at Miami's Tamiami Airport doing practice landings. Being inexperienced, she
forgets to make a required radio call downwind. VIASA, enroute from Venezuela and mak-
ing an approach to the wrong airport, hits her and they both crash. The jury finds that the
missing radio call contributed 1% to the crash. Three hundred people on VIASA are killed
or injured at an average cost of $300,000 each. What is your share of the liability? If VIASA
is allowed to protect itself with the Warsaw Convention and Montreal Agreement, you will
have to pay sixty-seven million five hundred thousand dollars. VIASA, 99% responsible,
gets by with just twenty-two million dollars.
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XII. CONCLUSION
After years of silence on the Warsaw Convention, the Supreme
Court has spoken twice within a year. Both decisions have implica-
tions which tend to uphold the government's restriction on the
rights of individuals. At this juncture it is difficult to ascertain
whether the airlines, who have great control over which cases are
settled and which are litigated, have decided that this Court is an
appropriate forum for their purposes, or whether the Court is
"reaching out" to cases that it rejected before. If the district court
in Bali finds that there was no "wilful misconduct" and applies the
liability limitations,'" the constitutionality issue could come
before the Court as soon as the next term. If it does, it is likely
that the conservative wing will prevail. There was no dissent in
Saks;' 6' the only dissent in Franklin Mint 6 ' was voiced by Justice
Stevens.
One possible solution is that the Court will uphold the limita-
tions but hold that they constitute a "taking" requiring compensa-
tion under the Tucker Act, as suggested by the Ninth Circuit.1 6
Some language in the majority opinion of Franklin Mint seems to
support this conjecture.
The political branches, which hold the authority to repudiate
the Warsaw Convention, have given no indication that they wish
to do so.
Article 22(4) of the Convention permits conversion of the
liability limit into "any national currency." In the United States
the authority to make that conversion has been delegated by
Congress to the Executive branch. The courts are bound to re-
spect that arrangement unless the properly delegated authority
is exercised in a manner inconsistent with domestic or interna-
tional law.' 67
Perhaps it is tenuous, but the Court could reach the conclu-
sion that if the executive branch and the Congress want to severely
163. In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 684 F.2d at 1301.
164. Saks, 105 S. Ct. at 1338.
165. Franklin Mint, 466 U.S. at 261 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166. In re Air Crash at Bali, Indonesia, 684 F.2d at 1301.
167. Franklin Mint, 104 S. Ct. at 1787.
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limit the citizens' right to recover when injured, they may do so if
they are willing to pay for the privilege.
DOUG JOHNSON
